Estate Planning-A New Legal Science by Polisher, Edward N.
Volume 50 
Issue 4 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 50, 
1945-1946 
6-1-1946 
Estate Planning-A New Legal Science 
Edward N. Polisher 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Edward N. Polisher, Estate Planning-A New Legal Science, 50 DICK. L. REV. 113 (1946). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol50/iss4/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
Dickinson Law Review
Published October, January, March and June by Dickinson Law Students
Vol. L. June, 1946 Number 4
Subscription Price $2.00 Per Annum 75 Cents Per Number
EDITORIAL STAFF
WILLIAM G. WILLIAMS, Editor in Chief
JOHN L. BIGELOW, Associate Editor
HARRY SPEIDEL, Associate Editor
WALTER H. HITCHLER, Faculty Editor
BUSINESS STAFF
GEORGE R. LEWIS, Business Manager
ROBERT S. SMULOWITZ, Assistant Manager
HENRY LANKFORD, Assistant Manager
JOSEPH P. McKEEHAN, Faculty Manager
ESTATE PLANNING - A NEW LEGAL SCIENCE
By
EDWARD N. POLISHER*
During the past century, the scope of American jurisprudence has expanded
tremendously due to a number of factors. Foremost among these has been the
industrialization of economic life. This inevitably led to a shift from the invest-
ment of wealth in real property to its investment in intangibles and securities.
Moreover, the new era gave rise to modern social and economic philosophies,
imposing upon wealth larger responsibilities to the nation and its people. This
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last has taken a dual form. One, through restraints upon the use of economic
power and the other, through taxation which assessed against wealth a larger
proportion of the cost of government. Taxation, however, far outstripped eco-
nomic restraints because of the more immediate needs of the nation to finance
its recently assumed social responsibilities; and, later, to provide funds for the
preparation and prosecution of the war. While the end of hostilities has re-
duced measurably our fiscal requirements, the governmental obligations remain-
ing will necessitate taxation to continue at high levels for some time to come.
Simultaneously, the practice of law has expanded to meet these changed
conditions. As a result, it has become a physical and mental impossibility for even
the most conscientious general practitioner to keep abreast of all the develop-
ments in the profession. Within the last two decades, there has developed a
marked trend towards specialization. The more known areas of specialization
at present include administrative law, corporation, labor relations, negligence,
utilities, insurance, estates and taxation. Taxation further divides itself into
smaller spheres of more intense specialization.
ESTATE PLANNING
Among such specialties is estate planning. It has only recently commanded
the interest of men of wealth. Its current importance reflects the magnitude of
the changes which have taken place in our social and economic structure.
Until about 30 years ago, the lawyer called upon to advise his client in
planning his estate had only to be concerned with the laws of devolution of the
State in which he practiced. Insofar as the estate's prospective liability for estate
and inheritance taxes was concerned, the lawyer was qualified to counsel his
client if he kept himself informed of the property in the estate which, at the
client's death, would be subject to State inheritance tax. The rates of tax were
slight and the payment of such State inheritance taxes would not disturb seriously
the client's plans for distribution of his estate.
In 1916, the Federal Government entered the field of estate taxation with
the imposition of an tstate tax based upon the value of the net estate transmitted
at death by the decedent. At the present time, there are two Federal estate taxes
imposed upon the 'estates of decedents. The first is the basic estate tax under
the Revenue Act of 1926, superseded by the Act of February 10, 1939, which
exempts estates up to a net value of $100,000. A credit of 80 percent of this
basic Federal estate tax computed under its rates is granted to each estate for in-
heritance taxes paid to any State. The second is the additional Federal estate
tax, as to which the Revenue Act of 1942 allows an exemption of $60,000 and
is applicable to estates of decedents dying after the date of its enactment, Oc-
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tober 21, 1942. This additional estate tax was first imposed by the Revenue Act
of 1932 and the rates of tax under it have been progressively increased, while
the exemptions granted to estates have been successively reduced. Both Federal
estate taxes are assessed at increasing, graduated rates, according to the value of
decedent's net estate.
The primary function of estate planning is not merely to minimize the tax
burden. A flexible and well integrated estate plan calculated to serve the best
interests of the client and his family may result in no tax benefits whatsoever and
still be of inestimable value. It embraces the development and preservation as
well as the ultimate distribution of estates. What in many instances would appear
to a client to be simply a matter of drawing up a last will, may upon investigation
turn out to be a highly complex problem involving business reorganizations,
creation of trusts, life insurance, adjustment of tax difficulties, etc., and, finally,
the drafting of a will. The lawyer must, therefore, constantly keep in mind the
twofold concept of estate planning. One, the current objective, whose purpose
is to arrange the property ownership within the family group so that it will bring
to the owner and his family the maximum of enjoyment and security which such
ownership can possibly provide. In this phase of estate planning, careful atten-
tion must be given largely to the operation of the Federal income and gift tax
statutes so that the exactions of these laws will be reduced to their lawful minima
and the benefits to the family unit thus correspondingly increased. To achieve
this, the ownership of the property must be so divided that the benefits flowing
from the property are distributed among the members of the family group in such
manner that each member of the unit receiving the income shall report it in his
own right. This is not the simple process it might appear to be. Lawyers familiar
with the common law and tax law concepts of gifts and trusts have come to un-
derstand the thin line of demarcation that often separates success from failure,
where efforts are made by the donor or settlor to retain a measure of control over
the property, while the income is intended to be made available to other members
of the family. It is axiomatic that to the extent that such measures succeed and
result in a lessening of the income tax burden, the larger is the net amount of the
income which remains for the use and benefit of the family unit.
The second phase of estate planning devotes itself to the disposition of the
estate owner's property at death. Here again, the objective is to arrange the estate
owner's affairs and his property ownership so that the maximum of such pro-
perty, reduced by minimum estate and inheritance tax levies, shall be transmitted
to his beneficiaries in a manner calculated to promote their best interests. In these
arrangements, we collide with the Federal income, gift and estate tax statutes,
with their insupportable conflicts which often resuli in the identical situation
being subject to tax under each statute, successively. To lead the estate owner
through this intricate and highly technical labyrinth of tax liability requires
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the guiding hand of a qualified expert, familiar not only with the applicable
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, the court decisions and the Treasury
regulations and rulings, but one who also possesses a keen and analytical appre-
ciation of the trends. The latter are sign posts along the road of his specialty
pointing to future developments. The importance of this qualification becomes
apparent at once when it is remembered that the Federal estate and gift tax
laws are in their formative stages and in process of development; and that the
action taken in reliance upon today's advice will not be reviewed for its tax
implications until sometime later, perhaps years later. The expert who properly
evaluates the trends in the changing tax scene will project their development in
formulating his advice.
There is a present need for independent counseling in estate planning,
divorced from all extraneous considerations other than the welfare of the estate
owner and the compensation paid to the expert for his services rendered in pre-
paring and presenting the estate plan. Associated with him would be the client's
attorney and his accountant, the trust company and the insurance underwriter,
where their services are indicated, all together forming a board of advisers and
each bringing to the client the special qualifications which his experience has
developed in his own field.
ESTATE SHRINKAGE
Every estate suffers shrinkage in amount. This is due to the payment by the
executors of the decedent's debts, medical and burial expenses, executors' and
legal fees, costs incident to the administration of the estate and the estate and
inheritance taxes, both Federal and State, for which the estate becomes liable.
What remains in the estate after the discharge of these items is then available for
distribution to the intended beneficiaries in the manner directed under the estate
owner's will.
The forces which tend toward the disintegration of wealth can no longer
be overcome by the estate owner through the simple process of dawing and
executing his last will and testament. A myriad of social, economic, financial
and tax factors enter into the process and all these must be taken into account
in our effort to preserve from undue shrinkage the results of the client's lifetime
of labor his estate.
It would be an impossibl'e task to attempt to cover, even sketchily, the whole
field of the broad concept of estate planning in one article. This dissertation
will, therefore, deal primarily with the implications of the Federal Estate Tax
which is the crucible through which the estate must pass and with which the
estate planner must cope.
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COMMON LAW CONCEPTS AND FEDERAL TAXATION
At the very outset, it is essential to point out that a proper understanding
of Federal tax law must be based upon the realization by lawyers that many
fundamental concepts generally accepted as part of the organic body of common
law are often disregarded in Federal taxation. To the uninitiated who think of
trusts, gifts, future interests, consideration, etc;, in terms of their definitions at
common law, it will come as a shock to learn that for Federal tax purposes these
terms may carry entirely different connotations.
The development of this process in the law of federal taxation stems from
the necessity of protecting the public revenue. To achieve this, a uniform system
of national taxation must be evolved which will apply equally to taxpayers in
like situations, unaffected by their places of residence within the United States.
Merely to state this proposition is to establish its justification.
The lw of federal taxation is fluid and in its formative stages. Its principal
aspects are not more than 30 years in the making. Its underlying concepts are
flexible, permitting their extension or contraction in accordance with the national
objectives in taxation sought to be attained. Changing conditions and revised
governmental policies as reflected by the rulings of the Treasury Department and
the enactments of Congress frequently shift the emphasis, or broaden or restrict
the scope of its application.
The confusion results from two principal causes. First, Congress in drafting
tax legislation often uses familiar legal terms which have acquired accepted
definitions in local law. However, these terms are given definitions under the
respective tax statutes which differ materially from those ascribed to them under
local law. While this creates confusion, it is an inescapable consequence of
building the structure of the law of federal taxation with tools of legal term-
inology fashioned for, and for centuries adapted to, other types of business trans-
actions. The alternative would be the creation of a new vocabulary of legal terms
with the attendant perplexity which would accompany such a change. One is
inclined to believe that the cure would be worse than the disease.
Secondly, the confusion is increased by the decisions of the courts upon which
falls the task of interpreting the statutes. It is inevitable that in the attempt on
the part of taxpayers to escape or lessen the weight of their taxes and the simul-
taneous effort of the taxing authorities to collect the taxes considered by them
to be due, there is an unpreveniable clash of interests. The courts must then
decide whether or not the particular transaction comes within the intended scope
of the statute which imposes the tax. Many times the statute uses language which,
if applied in its ordinary business sense, would produce a result that would make
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the tax law ineffective to accomplish the purpose which the courts believe Congress
intended. In such cases it would seem fair to say that the courts are not engaged
in upsetting common-law concepts but rather that common-law limitations are
not necessarily to be applied in the field of federal taxation.
THE PROBLEM ILLUSTRATED
TRUSTS
A few illustrations will point up the problem. In the law of trusts, the basic
concept under common law recognizes the separation of legal and equitable in-
terests. This line of demarcation, however, is not accepted in many instances
for federal tax purposes. In Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940), the
Supreme Court announced some new and advanced principles of trust economics
and federal taxation. There, an irrevocable trust was created by a husband with
income payable to his wife for a term of five years, at the end of which the
corpus was to be returned to him. As Trustee, he retained broad powers of man-
agement. The court held that where there is a short-term trust get up in an
intimate family group, the transaction will be subject to special scrutiny for
federal tax purposes. The economic realities of the situation will be considered
so that if the bundle of rights equitably and legally enjoyed by the family group
before and after the transfer remains the same for all practicable purposes, the
income of the trust will be treated as taxable to the settlor despite the creation
of the trust. This decision was handed down in the case of a short-term trust,
but its rationale has been extended by later decisions so that the term of the trust
is no longer a factor. A direct and concise statement of this philosophy is to be
found in what Judge Jerome Frank said in Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F. (2d)
775 (CCA-2, 1941): "We are admonished, too, that 'ownership' is not a term
of inflexible meaning, and that what is relevant to 'ownership' in determining the
niceties of rights or duties under the rules concerning trust estates may need
to be disregarded in applying the cruder test of taxability; in the law of trusts
the cutting edge of the pertinent rule must be razorsharp, while in income tax
law . . . the helpful image is rather that of a broad-sword."
Similarly, in the case of reciprocal trusts-that is, where each settlor creates
an irrevocable trust, the benefits of which inure to the other settlor-the taxing
authorities, supported by the decisions of the courts, treat the transaction as though
each settlor had created the trust for himself. The trust property is included in
his gross estate for federal estate taxation: Estate of Mary M. Cole, Deceased, v.
Commissioner, 140 F. (2) 636 (CCA-8, 1944); and the beneficiary may be
considered for federal gift tax purposes the donor of a reciprocal trust formally
created by another: Commissioner v. Warner, 127 F. (2d) 913 (CCA-9, 1942).
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PARTNERSHIPS
Similarly, the common-law concept of a partnership is disregarded and the
partnership unit taxed as a corporation where, despite its validity under local law,
the partners in their agreement have delegated authority to several of their num-
ber to carry on the business for them and the partnership is not dissolved upon
the death of any of the partners: Regulations 111, section 29.3797-4; or a part-
nership between husband, wife and children may be disregarded for federal in-
come tax purposes even though it is effectively created under state law because
of the control retained over the partnership interests given by the husband to
such members of the family: Losh v. Commissioner, 145 F. (2d) 456 (CCA-10,
1944); or because the husband's economic position remained unchanged after
the transfer of the interest in his business to his wife and the formation of a
partnership between them: Lusthaus v. Commissioner, -U.S.-(1946); Tower
v. Commissioner, -U.S.-(1946). Furthermore, a partnership between hus-
band and wife may be recognized under federal tax laws even in those states
where husband and wife may not be partners: Felix Zukaitis, 3 TC 814 (1944);
Willis B. Anderson, 6 TC, No. 123 (1946).
CONSIDERATION
In Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U. S. 308 (1945), the Supreme Court announced
an entirely new definition of "adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth." Those of us who practice in the state courts have regarded it as horn-
book law that- the consideration necessary to support a valid transaction under
common law could either be a benefit to the. promisor or a detriment to the
promisee. In this case, however, the Court declared that this is not to be the
definition of "adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth"
under the federal estate and gift tax statutes because the consideration necessary
for such a transaction must result in a "benefit to the transferor." That it may
be a detriment to the transferee is of no consequence.
FUTURE INTERESTS
Another instance is the definition and treatment of "future interests." Undcr
the federal gift law, the concept of future interests in the law of property, which
includes vested and contingent remainders, is totally disregarded. Under state
law, a vested interest is regarded as a present, matured interest in property.
In applying the federal gift tax statute, a vested remainder is, nevertheless, a
future interest if the enjoyment and possession of it are postponed to a future
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date. Hence, the annual Lxclusion is not allowed for such gifts. In Helvering
v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940), the Supreme Court stated that future interest
concepts under common law are the product of a medieval feudal economy
founded upon land as its principal item of wealth while the basis of wealth in
our modern economy rests largely upon intangibles and should be treated dif-
ferently.
GIFTS
One of the elements necessary under common law to create a valid gift
is the so-called "donative intent"-the intention on the part of the donor to make
a gift. The Supreme Court in Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 5 (1937), held
that the elements necessary for a valid gift were to be determined by local law.
Earlier, in Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 290 (1933), Mr. Justice Cardozo
declared that the transfer must have the quality of a gift. Yet, in Commissioner
v. Wemyss, 324 U. S. 303 (1945), the Supreme Court, interpring the pertinent
provision of the federal gift tax statute, stated that the presence of the donative
intent is not necessary to establish a transfer as a gift. The tax attaches to the
value of the property which the donor transfers in excess of "money's worth"
received by him: Section 1002, Internal Revenue Code (formerly Section 503,
Revenue Act of 1932).
In the light of these changes in our preconceived notions of the common
law, we can now discuss the Federal Estate Tax.
INCREASED RATES OF TAXATION AND REDUCED EXEMPTIONS
The rates of Federal Estate Tax have been increasel from time to time.
Under the Revenue Act of 1926 which imposed the Basic Estate Tax, the net
estate after the exemption of $100,000 was subject to tax at graduated rates which
were inconsequential and innocuous. They were: 1% on the first $50,000; 2%
on the next $50,000; 3% on the next $100,000; 4% on the next $200,000, etc.,
with a maximum of 20% on a net estate of $10,000,000 and over. For the
purpose of the Additional Estate Tax, the net estate after the specific exemption
of $60,000 is taxed at rates which increase progressively and sharply as the size
of the estate mounts. The rates range from 3% on the first $5,000 of the net
taxable estate to 28% on estates between $60,000 and $100,000 and so on up to
77% on estates of $10,000,000 and over, each bracket of the net estate being
subject to tax at the applicable rate for such bracket. The present rates represent
a sharp increase over those which were in effect prior to September 21, 1941,
which already included an additional 10% Defense Tax applicable to decedents
dying after June 25, 1940 and before September 21, 1941. The combined effect
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of the reduced exemptions discussed above and the increase in estate tax rates
has been to impose a heavier burden of such taxation upon a greater number
of estates.
THE CONCEPT OF THE GROSS ESTATE
Under Section 811 of the Internal Revenue Code, there is included in the
decedent's gross estate the value of all property of the decedent at the time of
his death. The concept of the "gross estate" has been continually expanded by
enactments of Congress, the decisions of the Federal Courts and the Regulations,
rulings and decisions of the Treasury Department. The result of these changes
has been to compel inclusion in the decedent's gross estate for Federal Estate
taxation of many types of property which under local law are either exempt from
inheritance or estate tax or are not includible as part of the decedent':; estate.
The property of the decedent is included in his gross estate to the extent of:
(a) The decedent's interest therein at the time of his death and passing
by Will or under the intestate laws: I.R.C. Sec. 811(a).
(b) The interest therein of the surviving spouse existing at the time of
the decedent's death as dower, curtesy or statutory substitute in lieu thereof: I.R.C.
Sec. 811(b).
(c) Any interest therein of which the decedent made a transfer, in trust
or otherwise, (1) in contemplation of death or (2) to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after death; or under which he has retained for his life (a)
the possession or enjoyment of or the right to the income from the property, or
(b) the right either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the
persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom, except
in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth. There is a presumption that any transfer of a material part of
the decedent's property within two years prior to his death without adequate
or full consideration was made in contemplation of death: I.R.C. sec. 811(c).
GIFTS IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH
In determining whether a gift was made in contemplation of death, the
decedent's motive is the controlling factor. The Supreme Court in United States
v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 (1931), defining the term "in contemplation of death",
said:
the reference is not to the general expectation of death
which all entertain. It must be a particular concern giving rise to
to a definite motive. . . .The motive which induces the transfer
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must be of the sort which leads to a testamentary disposition. Old
age may give premonitions and promptings independent of mortal
disease. Yet, age in itself cannot be regarded as furnishing a de-
cisive test, for sound health and purposes associated with life, rather
than with death, may motivate the transfer. . . .The dominant
purpose of the section is to reach substitutes for testamentary dis-
positions and thus prevent the evasion of the estate tax."
Although in ascertaining the decedent's motive the test is necessarily sub-
jective, there are four objective facts which are usually material. They are (1)
the decedent's physical condition, (2) his age, (3) the size of the transfer and
(4) the time interval which elapsed between the transfer and his death. Of
these, the state of decedent's health at the time of the transfer is the single most
definite objective criterion. Gifts made by persons between the ages of 80 and
90 have been held not to have been made in contemplation of death where the
donors were in good physical condition and there was evidence that the motives
which induced the transfers were associated with life:
Commercial National Bank, 36 BTA 239 (1937).
Smart v. U. S., 23 F. (2d) 188 (1927).
MOTIVES ASSOCIATED WITH LIFE
To determine decedent's motive, all the myriad of circumstances attending
the particular transfer must be carefully scrutinized. Motives associated with
continuance of life defeat the operation of this section. For example, the desire
to teach one's children how to handle money and to avoid the annoyance of their
frequent money demands (Wetherill, 36 BTA 1259 (1937)); to induce chil-
dren to enter the business of the parent (Willcuts v. Stoltze, 73 F. (2d) 868
(CCA-8, 1934)); to provide a means of support for a divorced daughter and
her family (Estate of J. B. Bryan, T. C. Memo. op. Dec. 13, 171(M) (1943));
to improve the financial circumstances of his children (Kroger v. Commissioner,
145 F. (2d) 201 (CCA-6, 1944) ); to give donees the opportunity to enjoy the
property during donor's lifetime (Margaret Fair, Executrix, v. U. S., 59 Fed.
Supp. 801 (W.D. Pa., 1945)); to procure competent management for her prop-
erty (Cushman Estate, 40 BTA 947 (1939)); to provide his wife with an
independent income (McGregor v. Com'r:, 82 F. (2d) 948 (CCA-1, 1936));
to reduce income taxes, avoid gift taxes and equalize the income of decedent
and his wife (Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48 (1936) ); Con-
stance McCormack, 38 BTA 308 (1938)); Kneeland, 34 BTA 816 (1936)).
MOTIVES ASSOCIATED WITH DEATH
Motives which have been held to be associated with death and, therefore,
cause the transfer to be includible in the gross estate embrace the desire to escape
estate taxes: Reg. 105, Sec. 81.16; Commonwealth Trust Co. of Pittsburgh v.
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Driscoll, 137 F. (2d) 653 (CCA-3, 1943), cert. den. 321 U. S. 164 (1944)).
Thus, the transfer of insurance policies by a decedent who was 45 years old at
the time and in good health for the express purpose of avoiding estate taxes was
held to be in contemplation of death: Slifka v. Johnson, 63 Fed. Supp. 289
(D.C.S.D.N.Y., 1945).
On the other hand, in the recent case of Allen v. Trust Co. of Georgia,
-U.S.-(1946), the decedent made several gifts in trust in 1925, reserving
the right to amend, but not to revoke, the trust. Upon being advised that the
reservation of such a power would cause the trust property to be includible in his
gross estate and thus subject to estate taxes, the decedent relinquished the power
in 1937, at the age of 81 and within two years of his death. The Supreme Court
reasoned that the decedent, a lawyer, at the time he created the trusts did not
believe that the reservation of such a power would require their inclusion in his
estate. Upon learning to the contrary, he released the power in ofder to ac-
complish what had been his original intention-namely to make complete and
absolute gifts to his children freed of all claims, including taxes. It, therefore,
held that the two year presumption that the release was made in contemplation
of death was overcome.
Transfers for the purpose of barring dower and curtesy rights are held to be
in contemplation of death: Kroger v. Commissioner, 145 F. (2d) 201 (CCA-6,
1944); Estate of Marion S. Gane, T. C. Memo. op. Dec. 14, 311(M) (1945).
The making of a gift at the same time and in the same proportions as the
decedent's will is a persuasive indication that the transfer was in contemplation
of death: Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F. (2d) 704 (CCA-5, 1935).
In dealing with the subject of gifts, it is important to remember that the
Federal Gift Tax law allows taxpayers an annual exclusion of gifts to the value
of $3,000 to each donee without limit as to number, and a specific exemption
of gifts to the amount of $30,000 for his entire lifetime: I.R.C., Sec. 1003,
1004.
Furthermore, if a gift is subsequently held to have been made in contempla-
tion of death and thus includible in the gross estate of the decedent, the gift tax
paid will be available as a credit against the estate tax: I.R.C., Sec. 813(a),
936(b).
TRANSFERS TO TAKE EFFECT AT DEATH
The section of the Code dealing with transfers to take effect at or after
death (811(c)) is probably the most confused and least understood of the entire
Estate tax law. It has been productive of much litigation. The Courts as well
as the Treasury Department have not been altogether clear or consistent in their
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positions on the identical issues. Both have reversed themselves at times, leaving
the taxpayer and his counsel bewildered and uncertain as to what the next pro-
nouncement would be.
In respect of transfers made prior to March 3, 1931, a remainder interest
created by the decedent during his lifetime which takes effect after a life interest
for the life of the decedent, whether life tenant was the decedent or not, is not
includible in the gross estate: May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
In arriving at its decision in the Heiner case, the Supreme Court adhered to
common law concepts of property and remainder interests. Applying this legal-
istic test to the transfer, it concluded that a vested remainder was a completed,
present transfer and that the subsequent death of the transferor did not shift any
interest in the property to the remainderman so as to render the transfer one
which took effect at death.
To overcome the damaging effect of this decision upon the Federal revenue,
Congress by Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, amended section 811(c) of the
Code to include transfers in which the transferor retained for his life or any
period not ending before his death (1) possession or enjoyment of, or income
from the property, or (2) the right to designate the persons who shall possess
or enjoy the property or income therefrom.
This amendment is applied prospectively and not retroactively. Thus, trans-
fers made prior to the adoption of the Joint Resolution by a decedent who died
subsequent thereto are unaffected: Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938).
POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER
If the interest reserved by the decedent would have reverted to the decedent
had he lived longer than the life beneficiary or beneficiaries, the property trans-
ferred will be includible in his gross estate. It is not material that the possession
and enjoyment in the donee continued uninterruptedly from the time of gift:
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
The evolution of this rule has itself had a tortuous history during which
the United States Supreme Court changed its position three times within a period
of nine years:
Klein v. U.S., 283 U.S. 231 (1931).
Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39 (1935).
Helvering v. Hallock, supra. (1940).
Many problems followed in the wake of these decisions which remained un-
an'wered. For instance, the Hallock case failed to answer the question whether
the tax will be applicable to "any possibility of reverter" no matter how remote.
124
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
If not, where is the line to be drawn? To what extent will tht property trans-
ferred subject to the decedent's possibility of reveter be included in his estate?
There were three possible approaches on valuation. First, the total value of
the property transferred; second, such value less the value of the intervening
estates created for others than the decedent; third, the value of the possibility
of reverter itself based upon accepted actuarial formulae. Previously, in two gift
tax cases, the Supreme Court had adopted the last mentioned choice where the
possibility of reverter was susceptible of valuation by the use of recognized
actuarial standards but further declared that such a basis would not prevail if the
valuation could not so be determined:
Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U. S. 184 (1943).
Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943).
More recently, the Supreme Court by its decisions adopted the first method of
valuation stated above and swept into the gross estate the total value of property
transferred by the decedent in her lifetime over which she retained a possibility of
reverter, if the life tenants predeceased her;
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. (Stinson Estate) v. Rothensies,
324 U.S. 108 (1945).
Commissioner v. Estate of L. Field, 324 U.S. 113 (1945).
Goldstone v. U.S., 65 S. Ct. 1323 (1945).
In its opinion in the Stinson case, the Court stated that the test of includibility
is not to be made dependent upon the proximity or remoteness of the decedent's
chance to regain the property under the possibility of reverter. It is sufficient if the
decedent retained a string over the property transferred which made it uncertain
until death who would own, enjoy or possess the property.
Thus, since the Hallock decision, the courts have struggled with the problem
of where to draw the line. How remote a possibility of reverter can be was
indicated in Estate of Goodyear, 2 T. C. 885 (1943), where the actuarial value
of the reverter of a trust involving a corpus of $338,000 was .0000000000876,
because the grantor to regain her property had to survive her son, the son's three
children and their issue. The Commissioner contended that under the rationale
of the Hallock case, the transfer should be includible in the decedent's gross estate
for estate tax purposes. The court, however, held differently. The decisions are
confusing and irreconcilable. See Lloyd's Estate v. Commissioner, 141 F. (2d)
758 (CCA-3, 1944) and Rothensies v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 112 F.
(2d) 758 (CCA-3, 1940). See also, Commissioner v. Estate of Ballard, 138
F. (2d) 512 (CCA-2, 1943) and Commissioner v. Bank of Calif.,-F. (2d.)-
(CCA-9, 1946).
By T. D. 5512, promulgated May 1, 1946, the Treasury Department has
endeavored to achieve some semblance of order out of the chaos which exists.
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The over all tests laid down by the Regulations require that the value of property
transferred by a decedent in his lifetime is includible in his gross estate, if:
a. possession or enjoyment of the transferred interest can be obtained
only by the beneficiaries who must survive the decedent, and
b. the decedent or his estate possesses any right or interest in the property
(whether arising by the express terms of the instrument of transfer or otherwise).
The regulations as amended by T.D. 5512 contain a series of examples intended
to illustrate when the transfer will be taxable and under what circumstances the
tax will not be imposed. Example 2, there given, reads as follows:
"The decedent, during his life, transferred property in trust,
giving the income therefrom to his son for life and the remainder
to his son's surviving issue. If no issue survived the life tenant,
the property was to revert to the decedent or his estate. This trans-
fer does not satisfy requirement (a) of this section, since the life
tenant's surviving issue need not survive the decedent in order to
obtain possession or enjoyment of the property. Accordingly, no
portion of the property is includible in the gross estate under this
section."
This result follows the decision of the Tax Court in Francis Biddle Trust, 3 TC
832 (1944), (Pet. for Rev. dismissed, CCA-3, Sept. 20, 1945) which held
that where the death of the grantor is not the intended event which enlarges
the interests or enjoyment of the beneficiaries, the transfer is not taxable as a
transfer to take effect at death.
To resolve doubts, all trust instruments should be reviewed promptly for the
purpose of eliminating any possibility of reverter or to determine whether the
transfer will be taxable for Federal Estate tax.
For further study of this difficult subject, see "The Hallock Problem: A
Case Study in Administration" by Louis Eisenstein, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 1141
(1945); "Transfers with Possibility of Reverter" by Edward N. Polisher,
Trusts & Estates, July, 1945.
REVOCABLE TRUSTS
There is also included in the gross estate of the decedent for estate tax
purposes the interest of the decedent in any property transferred in trust or other-
wise during his lifetime in which he reserved the power to alter, amend, revoke
or terminate the transfer, either alone or in conjunction with any other person:
I.R.C., Sec. 811(d).
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1936, the section dealing with revocable trusts
was sil'ent with respect to whether the capacity in which the power was retained
and the source from which it was derived were of any consequence.
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The Snpreme Court's decision in White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98 (1936)
pointed up and answered these questions. It held that where the grantor gave
the power to terminate the trust to the trustees but subsequently became one of
the trustees, through appointment by the other trustees, such power was ex-
ercised by her, not by virtue of any reservation in the declaration of trust but
rather by virtue of her appointment as trustee, and the property was, therefore,
not includible in her gross estate. This is still the law with respect to trusts created
prior to June 22, 1936.
Thereafter, to circumvent the obvious tax avoidance loopholes resulting
from the decision in White v. Poor, supra, the statute was amended to read
that the retention of such proscribed powers "in whatever capacity exercisable"
and "without regard to when or from what source the decedent acquired such
power" would be fatal to the transfer for estate tax purposes: Sec. 302(d) as
amended by Revenue Act of 1936.
The Revenue Act of 1936 also added the word "terminate" to the list of
forbidden powers. It was recently held, however, that the addition of this word
in no way changed the law but merely made the new section declaratory of exist-
ing law since the power to terminate produces the same result as a "revoca-
tion" and is thus applicable to transfers made before 1936: Holmes v. Commis-
sioner, -U.S.-(1946).
The terms "alter", "amend", "revoke" or "terminate" comprehend any
situation where the grantor retains a power, regardless of how it is worded or
what it may be termed, to vary materially the enjoyment of the property interests
transferred in trust. The determining element is the presence of the power in
the grantor to control by whom or in what proportion the income and corpus
of the trust shall be enjoyed: Union Trust Co. of Pittsburgh v. Driscoll, 138 F.
(2d) 152 (CCA-3, 1943) cert. den. 321 U.S. 764 (where the trustees, of whom
the grantor was one, had the right to vary the interests of the beneficiaries);
Holmes v. Commissioner, -U.S.-(1946) (where the grantor could terminate
the trust and thus accelerate the time of enjoyment).
Nor is it of any tax consequence that a retained power remained unexercised
at decedent's death and the trust property passed to originally designated bene-
ficiaries. It is the existence of the power at the time of death, not its exercise,
which causes the property to be included in the decedent's gross estate: McCaughn
v. Fidelity Trust Co., 34 F. (2d) 443 (CCA-3, 1929); nor is it of importance
that the grantor could not personally benefit through the exercise of such power:
Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436 (1933).
Any such power exercisable by the grantor alone or together with any other
person, even though such other person has a substantial adverse interest, will result
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in the tax being imposed: Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S.
85 (1936).
Where the power to terminate the trust is exercisable by persons other than
the grantor, the property is not includible, although such persons might revest
the property in the grantor: Commissioner v. Hall, 147 F. (2d) 946 (CCA-2,
1946). This is so despite the fact that the person possessing the power is the
wife of the grantor. The possible power of the grantor to influence his wife to
revoke the trust does not alter the situation: Kneeland et al, 34 BTA 816 (1936).
If the power can be exercised only as to a portion of the transfer, so much
as may be affected will be includible in the gross estate. Thus, in a transfer of
a life estate with a power retained which could only affect the remainder interests,
the value of the remainder interests alone are includible in decedent's gross estate:
Estate of Albert E. Nettleton, 4 T.C. No. 118 (1945).
Where the power retained is contingent upon the happening of a certain
event and the circumstances indicate that the contingency has not and is not likely
to occur, the transfer will not be taxable: Commissioner v. Ballard, 138 F. (2d)
512 (CCA-2, 1943); Helvering v. Tetzlaff, 141 F. (2d) 8 (CCA-8, 1944).
Similarly, if the decedent, having exercised the power, thereby extinguished
it, the transfer is not includible: Estate of 1. H. Burney, 4 T.C. 449 (1944).
PROPERTY HELD JOINTLY OR BY THE ENTIRETIES
The gross estate of the decedent includes the value of the interests held by
the decedent as joint tenant with any other person or as tenants by the entirety by
the decedent and spouse, or as community property, except such part as may be
shown to have originally belonged to such person and w.s never acquired from
the decedent for less than an adequate consideration in money or money's worth:
Sec. 811(e) (1).
Property so held is presumed to be part of the decedent's gross estate, ir-
respective of when the tenancy was created. The burden is upon the surviving
tenant to establish his contribution: U. S. v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 363 (1939).
The community property provision inserted by the Revenue Act of 1942
treats such property for estate tax purposes in the same manner as jointly owned
property, except that insofar as community property is concerned there is included
at all events in the decedent's gross estate, such part of the community property
as was subject to his power of testamentary disposition. The constitutionality of
this provision was upheld recently in Fernandez v. Weiner, - U. S,- (De-
cember 10, 1945).
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PROPERTY PASSING UNDER POWER OF APPOINTMENT
There is also included in the decedent's gross estate his interest in any prop-
erty (1) passing under a general power of appointment or (2) a special power of
appointment which could be exercised in favor of any beneficiary beyond the
restricted class as defined in the Revenue Act of 1942 except charitable organi-
zations described under Section 812(d) and 861(a) (3): I.R.C 811(f) (1) as
amended by the Revenue Act of 1942.
Special powers of appointment within a class which includes only the spouse
of the decedent, spouse of the creator of the power, descendants of the decedent
or his spouse, descendants (other than the decedent) of the creator of the power
or his spouse, spouses of such descendants, are exempt: I.R.C., Sec. 811(f)
(2)(3).
Until July 1, 1946, a tax free opportunity is granted to release or reduce
certain powers of appointment created before October 22, 1942, which exceed
in scope the restricted power as defined in the Revenue Act of 1942. An extended
release period is also provided for holders of such powers of appointment under
legal disability and in the military service to a date not more than six months
after the termination of such disability or military service.
The test is always the existence of the power, not its exercise by decedent.
See: Polisher "Estate Planning and Estate Tax Saving" Chapter VIII (1943).
LIFE INSURANCE
Proceeds of insurance policies on the life of the decedent are includible in
the gross estate of the decedent to the extent that they are (a) receivable by the
executor; (b) receivable by all other beneficiaries, in the proportion that: (1) the
premiums or other consideration paid for the insurance, directly or indirectly, by
the decedent bear to the total premiums paid, or (2) with respect to which the
decedent possessed any incidents of ownership in the policies at his death. In
determining the amount of premiums paid by the decedent, if he owned any
incident of ownership in the policies on or after January 10, 1941, (the date of
the issuance of T.D. 5032), all premiums paid by him before or after that date
are to be included. If, on the other hand, the decedent possessed no incident
of ownership in the policies on or after January 10, 1941, only such premiums
paid by him after that date need be considered: I.R.C., Sec. 811(g) (1) and (2)
as amended by the Revenue Act of 1942.
The Revenue Act of 1942, which radically changed the prior tests for the
includibility of insurance proceeds also abolished the $40,000 special exemption.
All insurance proceeds are now, therefore, includible if they fall 1within any one
of the statutory tests.
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The treatment of insurance proceeds for estate tax purposes has had a tortuous
history. The statutory provision prior to 1942 was as simple as it was ambiguous.
It stated that policies taken out by decedent on his own life were includible in his
gross estate. The exact meaning of the phrase "taken out by decedent upon his
own life" was difficult to define and its definition varied from time to time. In
the twenty-four years since the first inclusion of life insurance proceeds, the Treas-
ury Department has changed its position five times in setting up tests for the
determination of the question. The test in effect prior to January 10, 1941, the
effective date of T.D. 5032, was "incidents of ownership." This amendment
to the regulations made payment of premiums the sole criterion for the taxability
of insurance proceeds.
The Code, as amended, establishes two alternative criteria of taxability for
insurance policies payable to specific beneficiaries. One is the payment of pre-
miums and the other is possession of incidents of ownership.
The inquiry now must be directed to:
1. What are incidents of ownership?
2. What will constitute indirect payments?
INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP
Incidents of ownership include the following: the power'to change the bene-
ficiary: Chase National Bank v. U. S., 278 U.S. 327 (1929); the power to
surrender, cancel, assign, revoke an assignment, pledge the policy for a loan or
obtain from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of the policy: Lieb-
mann v. Hassett, 148 F. (2d) 247 (1945); the right of the insured or his estate
to its economic benefits: Regulations 105, Sec. 81.27. It is also indicated that a
power to change the beneficiary reserved to a corporation of which the decedent
is the sole stockholder is an incident of ownership in the decedent: Report of
Senate Finance Committee on Revenue Act of 1942, pp. 234-236.
Prior to the Act of 1942, the existence in favor of the decedent of the right
to have the proceeds of the policy revert to his estate in the event that the desig-
nated beneficiary predeceased him was considered an incident of ownership. The
Revenue Act of 1942 specifically eliminated such a reversionary interest in insur-
ance policies as an incident of ownership which would compel the inclusion of
proceeds in the decedent's gross estate. This change applies only to decedent's
dying on and after October 22, 1942. As to estates of decedents who died before
October 22, 1942, the retention of a reversionary interest by the decedent will be
treated as an incident of ownership causing proceeds to be included in the gross
estate in view of the Supreme Court decision in the Hallock case: Helvering v.
Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940); Bailey v. U. S., 31 Fed, Supp. 778 (1940),
Cert. dismissed on stipulation, 311 U. S. 721 (1940).
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DIRECT AND INDIRECT PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS
It is impossible to provide an exact definition of the phrase "directly or
indirectly." Primarily, it is a question of fact depending upon the circumstances.
On the one hand is the situation where a man supplies his wife with money for
the purpose of paying the premiums. There can be no question that he has paid
them indirectly although she performs the physical act of payment. Between
that case and one where the wife actually pays the premiums out of her own
estate, there are a host of doubtful situations including payments made by trusts,
family corporations, or corporations which are merely the alter ego of the insured.
It has been held, however, that where the decedent makes a gift to his wife
which is unrelated to the payment of insurance premiums and she subsequently
uses part of that gift for such payments, it will not constitute an indirect pay-
ment: John E. Cain Estate, 43 B.T.A. 1133 (1940). So, too, where the donees
of a gift of stock in 1935 sold the stock and purchased single premium policies
with the proceeds in 1936, the court held that since the gift was complete and
unconditional, there was no indirect payment of premiums: Dickson v. Smith,
-Fed. Supp.-(S.D. Ind., 1945).
Payment of premiums by a corporation which is the "alter ego" of the
decedent will constitute indirect payment: Regulations 105, Sec. 81.27. Just
what percentage of stock the decedent must hold for a corporation to be regarded
as his "alter ego" is a difficult question to determine. Where the decedent owned
only 51% of the stock, the court refused to regard the corporation as his "alter
ego:" Wilson v. Crooks, 52 F.(2d) 692 (1931); Estate of Doerken, 46 B.T.A.
809 (1942) Acq. 1942-1CB5. See also, Polisher "Estate Planning and Estate
Tax Saving" Chapter X (1943).
CONCLUSION
No estate plan is sound that fails to take into account the amounts which
the executors will need to discharge the estate's liability for debts, death charges
and Federal Estate tax. Nor will it be effective if it neglects to make available
to the decedent's executors, following his death, either the cash or the resources
readily convertible into cash without sacrifice of estate assets to pay such items.
For the very assets to which the decedent may anchor his estate plan to provide
for his family, may prove to be those which must later be resorted to by the
executors for conversion into cash to meet the death charges and estate taxes.
Moreover, effective estate planning contemplates a continuous relationship
between the lawyer and his client for the purpose of frequent reviews of the pro-
gram evolved in order to meet changing economic, tax and family conditions and
to make certain that the estate plan still fulfills the client's current needs.
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The moral of today's complex Federal estate tax structure is:
Never draw a will for a client until:
1. a complete estate inventory is compiled of all property which
will be includible under the Federal estate tax statute;
2. the death charges and Federal estate tax are computed;
3. an analysis is realistically made of the resources from which the
cash requirements of the executors to pay these items may be
anticipated;
4. a program is arranged to provide such cash, if the present assets
constituting the estate will not make it available without sacrifice
of estate assets through forced sale;
5. recommendations are made to minimize- the Federal estate tax
which will be imposed at death;
6. all legal, economic and other tax factors which will cumulatively
operate upon the testator's estate at his death have been pain-
stakingly appraised and considered.
Merely drawing a will may prove a costly procedure to the client.
